皮爾斯理論筆記

1.從或多或少的印象到單一的抽象. 首先是概念的形成.

會產生膚淺的直接的類似於印象的概念. 然後在這些印象或者膚淺直接概念的先決條件基礎上會產生基本的間接的普遍概念. 這間接的普遍的概念要對零碎的多樣的感性的印象或者類似於印象的膚淺直接的概念進行歸總或者歸一(unité). 然後這基本的概念可以獨立出來自由活動.

這也是從物質到存在的過程.

Substance→conception élémentaire médiate→ conception de l’unité de l’être

其中的印象或者膚淺的直接的概念被皮爾斯稱作conception of the general, in present. 被法語的學者翻譯作conception du présent en général. 這些逼近現在的感性印象或膚淺直接的概念是不具有包容性內涵性(connotation)的. 他們無非是注意的結果. 它們只是外界事物對人的精神吸引的後果. 這conception du présent en général在哲學上尚屬於物質的層次. 尚被稱作物質(substance). 在語言上用this或者ça來稱呼最恰當了. 它們在邏輯的proposition中是不可以作謂語的. 也不可以作為主語看待.

2.上述一(unité)在純語法上就是proposition上整體性的一.這一(unité)是通過謂語和主語之間的連結實現的. 謂語和主語之間的連結則需要系詞(copule). 這系詞往往就是be. 系詞是暗示性的. 它暗示了謂語出現的無限可能性, 它暗示這謂語的存在. 如果說主語具有純粹的不確定性,那麼謂語卻一定具有某些確定性. 我們可以說il y a une belle epllipse. 主語是不確的. 即普通語法上所提到的無人稱主語. 而A possède tous les caractères communs à toutes les choses是一句毫無意義的話. 因為所謂的les caractères communs à toutes les choses并不存在. 因此我們說,謂語一定要有一定的確定性明確性.

3. Toute perception(observation) exige un multiple d’impressions, une qualité qu’on lui attribue par hypothèse et un objet ou corrélat(correlate) avec lequel on compare l’objet de la perception(le relat) par référence à un fondement(ground).

Fondement (ground)是 pure abstraction甚至可以說是being. Quality是reference to a ground. Relat(Relate)是objet de la perception.

我們可以用下列的圖表來表示relate, intepretant以及correlate的關係.

A. Relate ↔ Interpretant(mediating and meditating representation) ↔ Correlate

B. One murder(皮爾斯舉的例子) ↔ Interpretant(mediating and meditating representation) ↔ Another murder (of the same type ?) coming to the observer’s mind with the comparison and help of which he may find some model, some law or at least some experience.

C. Relate(One object) ↔ Interpretant ↔Correlate(Another Object of the same gender but not necessarily the same)

D. Quality (Reference to a Ground),
Relation (Reference to a Correlate),
Representation (Reference to an Interpretant)

E. 具體體現如下

Quale--that which refers to a ground,
Relate--that which refers to ground and correlate,
Representamen--that which refers to ground, correlate, and interpretant.

因而說, Correlate是相對遙遠的,深藏與腦海的, 當前observer親歷過的,道聽途說的, 自別處窺探得到的, 憑空想來的經驗. 這種經驗或是可靠的真實發生過的或是不牢靠的. 可以說Correlate是先驗的. 然而,可靠與否, Correlate都是Interpretant產生的必經之路.

4. 在此,有必要記下皮爾斯的原句 :

Reference to a ground can not be prescinded from being, but being can be prescinded from reference to a ground.

Reference to a correlate can not br prescinded from reference to a ground, but reference to a ground can be prescinded from reference to a correlate.

同樣 我們可以說Reference to an interpretat can not bot prescinded from reference to a correlate, but the latter can be prescinded from the former.

5.所以說, 對某object (relate)的認識需要通過與其他object(correlate)的比較才能實現. 這種比較可以是一種harmony也可以是一種opposition. 因為correlate同relate可以是相同的也可以是相反的. 相反也能引起思考. Harmony關係的確立需要agreement, 而opposition關係的確立則僅能依賴一些correspondance(相關性,相應性). 遙遠的Correlate被驚醒折射到意識中參加和relate的談判,較量或者競賽. 這樣我們才會對relate的quality有所甄別, 知道是怎麼回事. (在這裡,我們誇大了correlate的角色. 這種比較永遠不如我們現在的比喻明郎. 這個過程的對我爾言總是存在一定的模糊性.總是覺得有另外一個層次超出我的理解能力範圍. 但我確又能感覺的其過程大致如此. 這大概就是皮爾斯說的vagueness.

6. 皮爾斯又從reference of a relate to its ground(大致這個過程可被理解作quality)和reference to an interpretant的關係親疏上進行了劃分. 他認為, 如果reference to a ground不能脫離reference to an interpretant而單獨存在, 那就是一種imputed quality. 如果可以脫離reference to an interpretant而獨立存在, 那麼這relate與相應的correlate在這某一品質(quality)的擁有上則是共同或共有關係(community 或concurrence). 這樣reference to a correlate是可以脫離reference to an interpretant而存在的.

皮爾斯對上列所有 representations(關於representation的定義, cf上列3. D.)分作三類 :

(1) Those whose relation to their objects is a mere community in some quality, and these representations may be termed Likenesses.

我們上面提到的relate同correlate之間harnomy, 具有相似性.

(2) Those whose relation to their objects consists in a correspondence in fact, and these may be termed Indices or Signs.

我們上面提到的不具相似性,甚至具有相逆性, 因而僅剩相關性或相應性. 相逆也是一種相應. 我們常說相應的對策.

(3) Those the ground of whose relation to their objects is an imputed character, which are the same as general signs, and these may be termed Symbols.

Symbols主要是離不開reference to interpretant. 但需要其他的corrleates來體現.

皮爾斯將對symbols(general signs)的處理分三類 : formal grammar, logic, rhetoric.

他還對symbols(general signs)分三類 : terms, propositions, arguments : 1) Symbols which directly determine only their grounds or imputed qualities, and are thus but sums of marks or terms 2) Symbols which also independently determine their objects by means of other term or terms, and thus, expressing their own objective validity, become capable of truth or falsehood, that is, are propositions; and, 3) Symbols which also independently determine their interpretants, and thus the minds to which they appeal, by premissing a proposition or propositions which such a mind is to admit. These are arguments.

從此處我們也可以看出皮爾斯在邏輯學上對symbols的理解. 他認為在邏輯學上, signs都只是純的未經現實蒼桑的心智上的符號. General signs. 或者說所有的objects都是a distinction can be made between concepts which are supposed to have no existence except so far as they are actually present to the understanding, and external symbols which still retain their character of symbols so long as they are only capable of being understood.

http://www.poetes.com/baroque/index.php

Le mot baroque vient du portugais barroco, ce qui signifie «perle irrégulière». Le terme, d'abord utilisé en histoire de l'art, désignait le travail d'architectes, de peintres et de décorateurs qui, dans la mouvance de la Contre-Réforme, ont voulu créer un art théâtral, spectaculaire, fait de courbes et de formes instables. Cette esthétique nouvelle, née en réaction à l'équilibre que la Renaissance avait héritée de l'Antiquité, inspira aussi des compositeurs qui, comme Monteverdi, désiraient que la musique soit plus libre, plus souple, de manière à ce qu'elle puisse mieux qu'avant imiter les sursauts de l'âme.

En poésie, notamment chez d'Aubigné, Tristan L'Hermite ou Vincent Voiture, le goût qu'avaient les architectes pour les façades courbes, donnant une impression d'instabilité, ce goût qu'avaient aussi les peintres pour le trompe-l'oeil, prend une allure plus grave où c'est la vie elle-même qui apparaît mouvante: l'amour est éphémère, le bonheur n'est rien d'autre qu'une illusion et l'existence devient une suite de métamorphoses où la réalité n'a désormais pas plus de poids qu'un souffle. Il n'est pas inutile, à ce propos, de rappeler que les incertitudes et les angoisses religieuses ont, tout au long du XVIe siècle et pour une bonne part du XVIIe, ébranlé la civilisation européenne; dès lors, il n'y a pas lieu de se surprendre que la poésie ait gardé la trace de la précarité des choses.

Le baroque en poésie, toutefois, s'est aussi développé au sein de milieux mondains, ce que notamment les oeuvres de Desportes et d'Urfé, le créateur de l'Astrée, nous font voir. Dans ces cas, l'inspiration est moins angoissée, plus artificielle aussi sans doute que chez d'Aubigné par exemple, mais l'art gagne alors de la virtuosité et une part ludique qui gagne à être appréciée.

這是Peirce符號學基礎文本的第一篇.法文譯本是Textes fondamentaux de sémiotique, Paris, Méridiens Klincksieck, 1987. 這也是毗爾斯符號學的必讀文章.

On a New List of Categories

Sec. 1. This paper is based upon the theory already established, that the function of conceptions is to reduce the manifold of sensuous impressions to unity, and that the validity of a conception consists in the impossibility of reducing the content of consciousness to unity without the introduction of it.

Sec. 2. This theory gives rise to a conception of gradation among those conceptions which are universal. For one such conception may unite the manifold of sense and yet another may be required to unite the conception and the manifold to which it is applied; and so on.

Sec. 3. That universal conception which is nearest to sense is that of the present, in general. This is a conception, because it is universal. But as the act of attention has no connotation at all, but is the pure denotative power of the mind, that is to say, the power which directs the mind to an object, in contradistinction to the power of thinking any predicate of that object, -- so the conception of what is present in general, which is nothing but the general recognition of what is contained in attention, has no connotation, and therefore no proper unity. This conception of the present in general, of IT in general, is rendered in philosophical language by the word "substance" in one of its meanings. Before any comparison or discrimination can be made between what is present, what is present must have been recognized as such, as it, and subsequently the metaphysical parts which are recognized by abstraction are attributed to this it, but the it cannot itself be made a predicate. This it is thus neither predicated of a subject, nor in a subject, and accordingly is identical with the conception of substance.

Sec. 4. The unity to which the understanding reduces impressions is the unity of a proposition. This unity consists in the connection of the predicate with the subject; and, therefore, that which is implied in the copula, or the conception of being, is that which completes the work of conceptions of reducing the manifold to unity. The copula (or rather the verb which is copula in one of its senses) means either actually is or would be, as in the two propositions, "There is no griffin," and "A griffin is a winged quadruped." The conception of being contains only that junction of predicate to subject wherein these two verbs agree. The conception of being, therefore, plainly has no content.

If we say "The stove is black," the stove is the substance, from which its blackness has not been differentiated, and the is, while it leaves the substance just as it was seen, explains its confusedness, by the application to it of blackness as a predicate.

Though being does not affect the subject, it implies an indefinite determinability of the predicate. For if one could know the copula and predicate of any proposition, as ". . . is a tailed-man," he would know the predicate to be applicable to something supposable, at least. Accordingly, we have propositions whose subjects are entirely indefinite, as "There is a beautiful ellipse," where the subject is merely something actual or potential; but we have no propositions whose predicate is entirely indeterminate, for it would be quite senseless to say, "A has the common characters of all things," inasmuch as there are no such common characters.

Thus substance and being are the beginning and end of all conception. Substance is inapplicable to a predicate, and being is equally so to a subject.

Sec. 5. The terms "prescision" and "abstraction," which were formerly applied to every kind of separation, are now limited, not merely to mental separation, but to that which arises from attention to one element and neglect of the other. Exclusive attention consists in a definite conception or supposition of one part of an object, without any supposition of the other. Abstraction or prescision ought to be carefully distinguished from two other modes of mental separation, which may be termed discrimination and dissociation. Discrimination has to do merely with the senses of terms, and only draws a distinction in meaning. Dissociation is that separation which, in the absence of a constant association, is permitted by the law of association of images. It is the consciousness of one thing, without the necessary simultaneous consciousness of the other. Abstraction or prescision, therefore, supposes a greater separation than discrimination, but a less separation than dissociation. Thus I can discriminate red from blue, space from color, and color from space, but not red from color. I can prescind red from blue, and space from color (as is manifest from the fact that I actually believe there is an uncolored space between my face and the wall); but I cannot prescind color from space, nor red from color. I can dissociate red from blue, but not space from color, color from space, nor red from color.

Prescision is not a reciprocal process. It is frequently the case, that, while A cannot be prescinded from B, B can be prescinded from A. This circumstance is accounted for as follows. Elementary conceptions only arise upon the occasion of experience; that is, they are produced for the first time according to a general law, the condition of which is the existence of certain impressions. Now if a conception does not reduce the impressions upon which it follows to unity, it is a mere arbitrary addition to these latter; and elementary conceptions do not arise thus arbitrarily. But if the impressions could be definitely comprehended without the conception, this latter would not reduce them to unity. Hence, the impressions (or more immediate conceptions) cannot be definitely conceived or attended to, to the neglect of an elementary conception which reduces them to unity. On the other hand, when such a conception has once been obtained, there is, in general, no reason why the premisses which have occasioned it should not be neglected, and therefore the explaining conception may frequently be prescinded from the more immediate ones and from the impressions.

Sec. 6. The facts now collected afford the basis for a systematic method of searching out whatever universal elementary conceptions there may be intermediate between the manifold of substance and the unity of being. It has been shown that the occasion of the introduction of a universal elementary conception is either the reduction of the manifold of substance to unity, or else the conjunction to substance of another conception. And it has further been shown that the elements conjoined cannot be supposed without the conception, whereas the conception can generally be supposed without these elements. Now, empirical psychology discovers the occasion of the introduction of a conception, and we have only to ascertain what conception already lies in the data which is united to that of substance by the first conception, but which cannot be supposed without this first conception, to have the next conception in order in passing from being to substance.

It may be noticed that, throughout this process, introspection is not resorted to. Nothing is assumed respecting the subjective elements of consciousness which cannot be securely inferred from the objective elements.

Sec. 7. The conception of being arises upon the formation of a proposition. A proposition always has, besides a term to express the substance, another to express the quality of that substance; and the function of the conception of being is to unite the quality to the substance. Quality, therefore, in its very widest sense, is the first conception in order in passing from being to substance.

Quality seems at first sight to be given in the impression. Such results of introspection are untrustworthy. A proposition asserts the applicability of a mediate conception to a more immediate one. Since this is asserted, the more mediate conception is clearly regarded independently of this circumstance, for otherwise the two conceptions would not be distinguished, but one would be thought through the other, without this latter being an object of thought, at all. The mediate conception, then, in order to be asserted to be applicable to the other, must first be considered without regard to this circumstance, and taken immediately. But, taken immediately, it transcends what is given (the more immediate conception), and its applicability to the latter is hypothetical. Take, for example, the proposition, "This stove is black." Here the conception of this stove is the more immediate, that of black the more mediate, which latter, to be predicated of the former, must be discriminated from it and considered in itself, not as applied to an object, but simply as embodying a quality, blackness. Now this blackness is a pure species or abstraction, and its application to this stove is entirely hypothetical. The same thing is meant by "the stove is black," as by "there is blackness in the stove." Embodying blackness is the equivalent of black.*** The proof is this. These conceptions are applied indifferently to precisely the same facts. If, therefore, they were different, the one which was first applied would fulfil every function of the other; so that one of them would be superfluous. Now a superfluous conception is an arbitrary fiction, whereas elementary conceptions arise only upon the requirement of experience; so that a superfluous elementary conception is impossible. Moreover, the conception of a pure abstraction is indispensable, because we cannot comprehend an agreement of two things, except as an agreement in some respect, and this respect is such a pure abstraction as blackness. Such a pure abstraction, reference to which constitutes a quality or general attribute, may be termed a ground.

Reference to a ground cannot be prescinded from being, but being can be prescinded from it.

Sec. 8. Empirical psychology has established the fact that we can know a quality only by means of its contrast with or similarity to another. By contrast and agreement a thing is referred to a correlate, if this term may be used in a wider sense than usual. The occasion of the introduction of the conception of reference to a ground is the reference to a correlate, and this is, therefore, the next conception in order.

Reference to a correlate cannot be prescinded from reference to a ground; but reference to a ground may be prescinded from reference to a correlate.

Sec. 9. The occasion of reference to a correlate is obviously by comparison. This act has not been sufficiently studied by the psychologists, and it will, therefore, be necessary to adduce some examples to show in what it consists. Suppose we wish to compare the letters p and b. We may imagine one of them to be turned over on the line of writing as an axis, then laid upon the other, and finally to become transparent so that the other can be seen through it. In this way we shall form a new image which mediates between the images of the two letters, inasmuch as it represents one of them to be (when turned over) he likeness of the other. Again, suppose we think of a murderer as being in relation to a murdered person; in this case we conceive the act of the murder, and in this conception it is represented that corresponding to every murderer (as well as to every murder) there is a murdered person; and thus we resort again to a mediating representation which represents the relate as standing for a correlate with which the mediating representation is itself in relation. Again, suppose we look up the word homme in a French dictionary; we shall find opposite to it the word man, which, so placed, represents homme as representing the same two-legged creature which man itself represents. By a further accumulation of instances, it would be found that every comparison requires, besides the related thing, the ground, and the correlate, also a mediating representation which represents the relate to be a representation of the same correlate which this mediating representation itself represents. Such a mediating representation may be termed an interpretant, because it fulfils the office of an interpreter, who says that a foreigner says the same thing which he himself says. The term "representation" is here to be understood in a very extended sense, which can be explained by instances better than by a definition. In this sense, a word represents a thing to the conception in the mind of the hearer, a portrait represents the person for whom it is intended to the conception of recognition, a weathercock represents the direction of the wind to the conception of him who understands it, a barrister represents his client to the judge and jury whom he influences.

Every reference to a correlate, then, conjoins to the substance the conception of a reference to an interpretant; and this is, therefore, the next conception in order in passing from being to substance.

Reference to an interpretant cannot be prescinded from reference to a correlate; but the latter can be prescinded from the former.

Sec. 10. Reference to an interpretant is rendered possible and justified by that which renders possible and justifies comparison. But that is clearly the diversity of impressions. If we had but one impression, it would not require to be reduced to unity, and would therefore not need to be thought of as referred to an interpretant, and the conception of reference to an interpretant would not arise. But since there is a manifold of impressions, we have a feeling of complication or confusion, which leads us to differentiate this impression from that, and then, having been differentiated, they require to be brought to unity. Now they are not brought to unity until we conceive them together as being ours, that is, until we refer them to a conception as their interpretant. Thus, the reference to an interpretant arises upon the holding together of diverse impressions, and therefore it does not join a conception to the substance, as the other two references do, but unites directly the manifold of the substance itself. It is, therefore, the last conception in order in passing from being to substance.

Sec. 11. The five conceptions thus obtained, for reasons which will be sufficiently obvious, may be termed categories. That is,

BEING

Quality (Reference to a Ground),
Relation (Reference to a Correlate),
Representation (Reference to an Interpretant),

SUBSTANCE

The three intermediate conceptions may be termed accidents.

Sec. 12. This passage from the many to the one is numerical. The conception of a third is that of an object which is so related to two others, that one of these must be related to the other in the same way in which the third is related to that other. Now this coincides with the conception of an interpretant. An other is plainly equivalent to a correlate. The conception of second differs from that of other, in implying the possibility of a third. In the same way, the conception of self implies the possibility of an other. The Ground is the self abstracted from the concreteness which implies the possibility of an other.

Sec. 13. Since no one of the categories can be prescinded from those above it, the list of supposable objects which they afford is,

What is.

Quale--that which refers to a ground,
Relate--that which refers to ground and correlate,
Representamen--that which refers to ground, correlate, and interpretant.

It.

Sec. 14. A quality may have a special determination which prevents its being prescinded from reference to a correlate. Hence there are two kinds of relation.

First. That of relates whose reference to a ground is a prescindible or internal quality.

Second. That of relates whose reference to a ground is an unprescindible or relative quality.

In the former case, the relation is a mere concurrence of the correlates in one character, and the relate and correlate are not distinguished. In the latter case the correlate is set over against the relate, and there is in some sense an opposition.

Relates of the first kind are brought into relation simply by their agreement. But mere disagreement (unrecognized) does not constitute relation, and therefore relates of the second kind are only brought into relation by correspondence in fact.

A reference to a ground may also be such that it cannot be prescinded from a reference to an interpretant. In this case it may be termed an imputed quality. If the reference of a relate to its ground can be prescinded from reference to an interpretant, its relation to its correlate is a mere concurrence or community in the possession of a quality, and therefore the reference to a correlate can be prescinded from reference to an interpretant. It follows that there are three kinds of representations.

First. Those whose relation to their objects is a mere community in some quality, and these representations may be termed Likenesses.

Second. Those whose relation to their objects consists in a correspondence in fact, and these may be termed Indices or Signs.

Third. Those the ground of whose relation to their objects is an imputed character, which are the same as general signs, and these may be termed Symbols.

Sec. 15. I shall now show how the three conceptions of reference to a ground, reference to an object, and reference to an interpretant are the fundamental ones of at least one universal science, that of logic. Logic is said to treat of second intentions as applied to first. It would lead me too far away from the matter in hand to discuss the truth of this statement; I shall simply adopt it as one which seems to me to afford a good definition of the subject-genus of this science. Now, second intentions are the objects of the understanding considered as representations, and the first intentions to which they apply are the objects of those representations. The objects of the understanding, considered as representations, are symbols, that is, signs which are at least potentially general. But the rules of logic hold good of any symbols, of those which are written or spoken as well as of those which are thought. They have no immediate application to likenesses or indices, because no arguments can be constructed of these alone, but do apply to all symbols. All symbols, indeed, are in one sense relative to the understanding, but only in the sense in which also all things are relative to the understanding. On this account, therefore, the relation to the understanding need not be expressed in the definition of the sphere of logic, since it determines no limitation of that sphere. But a distinction can be made between concepts which are supposed to have no existence except so far as they are actually present to the understanding, and external symbols which still retain their character of symbols so long as they are only capable of being understood. And as the rules of logic apply to these latter as much as to the former (and though only through the former, yet this character, since it belongs to all things, is no limitation), it follows that logic has for its subject-genus all symbols and not merely concepts.*** We come, therefore, to this, that logic treats of the reference of symbols in general to their objects. In this view it is one of a trivium of conceivable sciences. The first would treat of the formal conditions of symbols having meaning, that is of the reference of symbols in general to their grounds or imputed characters, and this might be called formal grammar; the second, logic, would treat of the formal conditions of the truth of symbols; and the third would treat of the formal conditions of the force of symbols, or their power of appealing to a mind, that is, of their reference in general to interpretants, and this might be called formal rhetoric.

There would be a general division of symbols, common to all these sciences; namely, into,

1) Symbols which directly determine only their grounds or imputed qualities, and are thus but sums of marks or terms;

2) Symbols which also independently determine their objects by means of other term or terms, and thus, expressing their own objective validity, become capable of truth or falsehood, that is, are propositions; and,

3) Symbols which also independently determine their interpretants, and thus the minds to which they appeal, by premissing a proposition or propositions which such a mind is to admit. These are arguments.

And it is remarkable that, among all the definitions of the proposition, for example, as the oratio indicativa, as the subsumption of an object under a concept, as the expression of the relation of two concepts, and as the indication of the mutable ground of appearance, there is, perhaps, not one in which the conception of reference to an object or correlate is not the important one. In the same way, the conception of reference to an interpretant or third, is always prominent in the definitions of argument.

In a proposition, the term which separately indicates the object of the symbol is termed the subject, and that which indicates the ground is termed the predicate. The objects indicated by the subject (which are always potentially a plurality -- at least, of phases or appearances) are therefore stated by the proposition to be related to one another on the ground of the character indicated by the predicate. Now this relation may be either a concurrence or an opposition. Propositions of concurrence are those which are usually considered in logic; but I have shown in a paper upon the classification of arguments that it is also necessary to consider separately propositions of opposition, if we are to take account of such arguments as the following: --

Whatever is the half of anything is less than that of which it is the half:

The subject of such a proposition is separated into two terms, a "subject nominative" and an "object accusative."

In an argument, the premisses form a representation of the conclusion, because they indicate the interpretant of the argument, or representation representing it to represent its object. The premisses may afford a likeness, index, or symbol of the conclusion. In deductive argument, the conclusion is represented by the premisses as by a general sign under which it is contained. In hypotheses, something like the conclusion is proved, that is, the premisses form a likeness of the conclusion. Take, for example, the following argument:

Here the first premiss amounts to this, that "P', P'', P''', and P''''" is a likeness of M, and thus the premisses are or represent a likeness of the conclusion. That it is different with induction another example will show.

Hence the first premiss amounts to saying that "S', S'', S''', and S''''" is an index of M. Hence the premisses are an index of the conclusion.

The other divisions of terms, propositions, and arguments arise from the distinction of extension and comprehension. I propose to treat this subject in a subsequent paper. But I will so far anticipate that as to say that there is, first, the direct reference of a symbol to its objects, or its denotation; second, the reference of the symbol to its ground, through its object, that is, its reference to the common characters of its objects, or its connotation; and third, its reference to its interpretants through its object, that is, its reference to all the synthetical propositions in which its objects in common are subject or predicate, and this I term the information it embodies. And as every addition to what it denotes, or to what it connotes, is effected by means of a distinct proposition of this kind, it follows that the extension and comprehension of a term are in an inverse relation, as long as the information remains the same, and that every increase of information is accompanied by an increase of one or other of these two quantities. It may be observed that extension and comprehension are very often taken in other senses in which this last proposition is not true.

This is an imperfect view of the application which the conceptions which, according to our analysis, are the most fundamental ones find in the sphere of logic. It is believed, however, that it is sufficient to show that at least something may be usefully suggested by considering this science in this light.

Notes

2. Herbart says: "Unsre saemmtlichen Gedanken lassen sich von zwei Seiten betrachten; theils als Thaetigkeiten unseres Geistes, theils in Hinsicht dessen, was durch sie gedacht wird. In letzterer Beziehung heissen sie Begriffe, welches Wort, indem es das Begriffene bezeichnet, zu abstrahiren gebieted von der Art und Weise, wie wir den Gedanken empfangen, produciren, oder reproduciren moegen." But the whole difference between a concept and an external sign lies in these respects which logic ought, according to Herbart, to abstract from.
Return to text.

這是一篇不可能結束的文章,這是一個永遠不可能沒有爭議的題目... 我只能寫下我努力整理過的思維的片段...

皮爾斯的符號學三分法. 他分為signe(或可稱為representamen), interpretant, objet.

F. Rastier 在Intellectica中認為符號(signe)和意義(sens)是對立的, 前者屬於邏輯與思想的範疇, 後者屬於文本的範疇. 前者是去語境(décontextualisation)的,而後者是需要語境的.

皮爾斯現象學phanéroscopie中有種普遍的三分法,或者說有三個普遍的範疇. 這個範疇是皮爾斯看事情的基礎. 這三個範疇是priméité, secondéité, tiercéité,是Qualité, Relation et Représentation. 他後來把這三個範疇從不同的角度命名為icône, indice, symbole或者qualisigne, sinsigne, légisigne.

其中, 第一個範疇icône著重事物自身的品質或者事物自身,用流行的字眼說那或許是一種自我意識. 我們還是用西方的語言引述" le mode d’être de ce qui est tel qu’il est et sans référence à quoi que ce soit d’autre " (Lettre à Lady Welby 12/10/1904, reproduite in [Deledalle 1978]皮爾斯的原話. 我們在此強調 « 著重 »這個動詞, 也強調 « 自身 »即其獨立性"self-reflexive, self-contained, and self-sufficient” 當然單獨思考一件事物事困難地甚至不可能地. 皮爾斯說« Une icône est un représentamen dont la qualité représentative est la priméité du représentamen en tant que premier. C’est-à-dire qu’une qualité qu’elle a en tant que chose la rend apte à être un représentamen. » (Ecrits sur le signe, Peirce, p.148.)他繼續說到 : « (Mais), un signe PAR CONTRASTE ne dénote son objet qu’en vertu d’un contraste ou secondéité entre deux qualité...

Un signe par priméité est une image de son object ... ne peut qu’être une Idée.(Ibid.p.149) »

皮爾斯說Icône同objet dynamique之間沒有關聯. 這種表述是不確切的, 他或許相說icône側重的是representamen的自身的品質是不受外界objet dynamique決定的. 因為只要談icône, indice, symbole三者的分類,就是從signe與objet的關係談的.

第二個層次側重關係, 側重一種指示關係. 確切地說,通俗地說,是 « 毗鄰 contiguïté»關係, 是 « 顯示indication »關係, 是一種"借代 (提喻)"關係 . 最簡單地例子就是閃電意味著雷聲的到來, 看見茶杯可能會想到茶. 這第二個層次就是indice. 語言中的mots «embrayeurs» (« ceci », « je », « ici »)就體現一種relation indicielle. 自然,語言符號又是一種symboles.

第三個層次是symbole. Symbole體現的則是一種規則, 常常是"約定俗成convention "或者是由文化習慣決定的. 一張入場券, 一張支票都體現了symboles的存在. 當一個符號依循這樣那樣的規則或者約定俗成而. (依我的看法,symbole首先是個符號, 這個符號(signe)本身或已具備自己的interprétant, 或者不具備自己的interprétant(我們可以稱這樣的符號為signe déficient, 皮爾斯不曾提到過或不曾明確過). 這個符號作為symbole時,它本身已經具有的interprétant"似乎–-實際上只是變得隱性了 "顯得失去了意義.)

This discussion, reproduced at 2,292, gives two divergent definitions of the symbol. In the first place, it is "a rule that will determine its Interpretant"; in the second, this is found to require specification of the replica:

The word ["man"] has no existence although it has a real being, consisting in the fact that existents will conform to it. It is a general mode of succession of three sounds or representamens of sounds, which becomes a sign only in the fact that a habit, or acquired law, will cause replicas of it to be interpreted as meaning a man or men. (2,292).

Notice that the "succession of sounds" is a succession of material qualities rendered significant by convention. The word is just such a convention, and its replica is what enables it to "act as a sign" (my emphasis).

Icons are portraits and paintings, indices are natural and causal signs, symbols are words and so on.

On distinguera donc la priméité, la secondéité et la tiercéité dans le representamen, dans le mode de renvoi du representamen à l'objet, et dans la façon dont l'interprétant opère la relation entre le representamen et l'objet.

其實,依據簡單的解釋:

一 : Icône(圖像)與objet的關係是單一第一層次的, qualité上的ressemblance,如一張圖片(image)它本身也是一種存在的representamen, 它與實物間的apparence(也是qualité)的相像是我們稱它為icône的原因. 這一層次是最基本的,我們稱之為priméité. 這個層次又可以分為image, diagramme和métaphore. 一個畫在牆壁上的箭頭,首先我們可以說它是對真實箭頭objet的ressemblance因此是image. 然而它更應該是一個diagramme.因為那是對方向關係的模擬.

二Indice(跡象)與objet的關係是第二個層次上的,是同qualité無關的東西.這個層次在意的是種存在. 比如, « 打噴嚏 » 這個現象可能與感冒有關係. « 打噴嚏 »和 « 感冒 »之間不具有相象性,而具有相鄰性. 感冒引起打噴嚏. 風向標的轉動方向與風的方向,是一種毗鄰的因果關係. 風的流動帶動了風向標的走向. Indice可以說是一種cause-effet的關係.

在圖像與實物間也存在著relation indicielle. 一幅人物畫像可能說明一個人的存在,因為有這個人存在才會有他的這幅圖.這時, légende-texte中說這是一幅肖像(portrait)對於證明這一relation indicielle是非常有必要的.因為légende-texte讓看到人物畫的人知道這是模擬一個人畫的, 這個人是存在的.

三而symbole則依賴一種規則或者習慣或者約定俗成存在, 依據這一規則或習慣或約定俗成來影射objet(實物)–-也有人說是影射interpretant. 如@這個符號,如果沒有人們之間形成的約定,誰也不懂得它代表電子郵箱, 更沒有人知道它代表什麼. Symbole有時是抽象的它是中généralisation. 它需要在實際的日場的表現中得到體現,否則它會失效消逝 ... 它需要occurences證明. 它的實際反映和表現,我們稱為répliques. Symbole的存在需要indexicality, 即 : 某個符號出現,就是因為話語發出者要表達某情感或思想或事物 symbole最複雜,是argument,是個說明過程,陳述過程.

如在交通法規中, “紅燈”是中symbole(象徵). 但是它的每次實際反應和表現都是一種indice. 紅燈的出現是因為需要行人停下來的情況發生. 在語言中,一個詞是一個symbole.

上面提到的箭頭, 在日場生活中已經成為人們的習慣或約定俗成. 看到它,人們都知道它表示要朝某個方向走.

可見這三個層次不是孤立的.

Comment les Occidentaux ont-ils pu oublier cette expression: Pas de pays sans paysans? Les sinologues occidentaux doivent savoir mieux que quiconque qu'il n'y aurait pas de Chine sans paysans.

Il pleut落雨了...落下了女人的音符,死在記憶里的音符

in Sic, n°12, décembre 1916.

引述

今天創建這個blog暨今天的日記...

今天下午受了Nora的誘惑創建了這個blog///